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REGULATION BY THE INTERNATIONAL

COUNCIL OF MUSEUMS: AN EXAMPLE OF THE
ROLE OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL
ORGANIZATIONS IN THE TRANSNATIONAL

LEGAL PROCESS
JAMES A.

R. NAFZIGER*

The massive looting, scarring, destruction, and international
smuggling of the artistic and archaeological heritage of national
patrimonies has received, as it has deserved, widespread public
concern and commentary.' The plunder of national art treasures
has been called quite aptly the "murder of man's history. '2
Individuals, professional groups, governments, intergovernment3
al organizations, and non-governmental organizations (NGO's)
have all recently come to the rescue. Their efforts have led to
the emergence of a transnational regulatory regime which, as
will be seen, is both directed toward and supported by a gradual
substitution among relevant global actors of the value of enlightenment for that of wealth.
The emerging regime of control is highly pluralistic; it
includes multilateral conventions, bilateral treaties, domestic
antiquity and export-import laws, private bilateral agreements,
enforcement by the International Criminal Police Organization
(Interpol), voluntary self-regulation by museums, domestic and
Administrative Director, American Society of International Law; and
Lecturer, Catholic University of America School cf Law. The author
gratefully acknowledges the cooperation and assistance of Hugues de
Varine-Bohan, Director, and Bonnie Burnham, Project Coordinator,
International Council of Museums and especially Ann Zelle, Executive
Secretary of the U.S. Naticnal Committee of ICOM.
1 Coggins, Illicit Traffic in Pre-Columbian Antiques, 29 ART JOURNAL 94
(1969); Coggins, The Maya Scandal: How Thieves Strip Sites of Past
Cultures, 1 SlvNmSONIAN 8 (1970); Evans, Archaeology and Diplomacy
in Latin America, FOREIGN SERVICE J 35 (1968); Gaskill, They Smuggle
History, Illus. London News, June 14, 1969, at 26; Hamblin, The BillionDollar Illegal Art Traffic-How It Works and How to Stop It, 3 SMrrHSONIAN 16 (1972); Williams, Destruction in the Name of Art, HARV.
TODAY 3 (1972); Zelle, Acquisitions: Saving Whose Heritage? 49 MuSEUM NEWS 19 (1971); Christian Science Monitor (six part series), July
12, 1971, at 9, col. 1; July 13, 1971, at 9, col. 1; July 14, 1971, at 9, col.
1; July 15, 1971, at 9, col. 1; July 16, 1971, at 9, col. 1; July 17, 1971, at
9, col. 1; N.Y. Times, April 4, 1970, at 5, col. 3; June 4, 1972, at 3, col.
5; Wall Street Journal, June 2, 1970, at 1, col. 1; Washington Post, March
10, 1970, at A12, col. 7; April 4, 1970, at Bl, col. 1.
2 Wall Street Journal, June 2, 1970, at 1, cal. 1.
3 That is, "any international organization which is not established by
inter-governmental agreement . . ."U.N. ECOSOC Res. 288(X), (1970).
*
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international NGO programs and controls, and, to a perhaps
diminishing extent, the market itself. Although there has been
useful commentary on some aspects of this regime, little of it
pertains to the role of such NGO's as the International Council
of Museums (ICOM).
As a potential leader in the process of regulating both
local acquisitions and transfers of art and artifacts, ICOM is
interesting first in respect of its specific functions of control.
Moreover, and more generally, as an organization showing signs
of transformation from a static, conference orientation to a
dynamic instrumentality of social action, ICOM is interesting in
respect of the emerging role of non-governmental organizations
in the transnational legal process. This study will explore both
of these dimensions of ICOM's institutional role. It represents
one effort in what has been described as the "tremendous job"
of investigating the practices of international organizations,
in applying their basic norms and law. Such investigation can
serve as a foundation for the sort of comparative analysis and
general theory which improves the capacity of international
organizations to engage in responsive and effective decisionmaking.
Most countries have their own legal controls over international traffic in art treasures.5 It is clear, nevertheless, that
by themselves, domestic governmental controls, based upon
criminal and antiquity laws, civil suits, policing of sites, border
controls, taxation, duties, tariffs, and the like are insufficient.6
It has been noted, for example, that domestically the "problem
cannot be dealt with through the existing channels of criminal
law since the very concept of a cultural heritage transcends
Sohn, The Growth of the Science of International Organization,in THE
RELEVANCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 267 K. Deutsch and S. Hoffman ed.
1968.
5 Two unpublished summaries of municipal controls are, Protection of
Art Treasures and Antiquities in Various European Countries (Library
of Congress, Law Library, European Law Division, July (1969), and
4

J.

ON

NAFZIGER, REPORT TO THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
MUNICIPAL LEGAL RESPONSES TO THE INTERNATIONAL MOVEMENT OF

NATIONAL ART TREASURES.

6 Among the vicissitudes of the numerous municipal controls are lax

domestic law enforcement; an overemphasis on reactive export,
rather than import, controls; the weakness of the corresponding market mechanism; reliance upon control systems of guards and inspectors that are often prohibitively expensive for the art-rich developing countries; the ancillary susceptibility of poorly paid guards and
inspectors to bribes; the susceptibility of other agents of law enforcement, including judges, to bribes (known as "mordida" in the Spanishspeaking countries); the lure of hard currency from foreign purchasers
in preference to indigenous currency sometimes available from the
government

or local purchasers;

topographic and logistic

obstacles,

particularly in the remote, cften treasure-laden, areas of developing
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traditional notions of ownership and title."' 7 It seems imperative
that non-governmental controls be developed.
Several professional and learned associations have led in
the expression of domestic non-governmental concern within the
United States -most notably the American Society of International Law, the College Art Association of America, the Archaeological Institute of America, and the Society of American Archaeology.8 But the efforts of these organizations have been hancountries; an iron law of inflation that sets prices on the international
antiquities market beyond government control; draconian, sometimes
completely proscriptive, export controls and embargoes that counterprcductively drive up the market and invite disobedience; the difficulty
of controlling the movement of items intended for re-export in such
6ntrepots as Switzerland and Lebenon; and the impossibility of sealing
off borders and intercepting diplomatic pouches, which may contain
contraband in cultural property (see, e.g. Evans, supra note 1). In view
of such deficiencies in the municipal regime cf control, it is not surprising that the laws are found to be honored more in their breach than
in their observance. See, with respect to muniepial controls in Latin
America, Evans, id. On the efficacy of holding out the "carrot" of more
liberal loan policies, and financial aid, as an alternative to the "stick"
of rigid controls, see Hamblin, supra note 1, at 25.
Proposals for more efficacious domestic regimes of control have included, inter alia, the encouragement of higher insurance rates for the
storage of art objects, so as to prompt their release on loan or exchange;
the elimination of long-term capital gains tax treatment of cultural
property; a restriction on tax exemptions for charitable contributions
of objets d'art to those of unimpeachable provenance; provisions (such
as those in effect in Japan and Great Britain) for a public or governmental option, at the declared valuation for a sale, to purchase treasured objects intendcd for export; a tariff on the export of certain
classes of cultural property; a sales tax on all foreign sales; a general
sales tax with forgiveness or rebate in the case of a domestic sale; a
revocation of the tax-exempt status of museums that accept illegally exported or otherwise obtained items; and museum subsidies.
A special panel of the American Society of International Law prepared two resclutions that, if implemented, promise some hope of more
effective U.S. controls over the flow of illegally exported objects into
this country. One of these resolutions recommended emergency congressional authorization to the President, to prohibit the import into
the U.S. of designated cultural property that formed part of another
country's heritage; and another called for prompt measures to protect
pre-Columbian monumental and architectural sculpture and murals exported contrary to the laws of the countries of origin. The resolutions
were transmitted to the Secretary of State, and were subsequently
supported by the American Institute of Archaeology. The Secretary of
State proposed measures which became H.R. 9463 in order to accomplish the purpose of the latter resolution. H.R. 9463 was reported out
from the Committee on Ways and Means, Feb. 7, 1972, Report No.
92-824.
7 Gordon, The UNESCO Convention on the Illicit Movement of Art Treasures, 12 HARV. INT'L L. J. 537, 541 (1971).
S The respcnses of the first two of these organizations are summarized
in Zelle, supra note 1, at 22. The College Art Association adopted a resolution at its 1972 meeting that expressed concern about the failure of
the U.S. government to ratify the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property. Letter from Edward N. Wilson, Secretary,
College Art Association of America, to the author, July 10, 1972. The
Association cf the Bar of the City of New York held a program on the
subject, March 9, 1970. The Society of American Archaeology held a
symposium on "Looting the Past: An International Scandal" on December 29, 1971, during the annual meeting in Philadelphia of the American
Association for the Advancement cf Science. Aside from these domestic
responses, several international NGO's have helped kindle public awareness of the underlying problem. These NGO's include the International
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dicapped by their relative isolation from the critical constituency
of large volume collectors. By far the leading U.S. non-governmental organization with such a critical constituency is the
American Association of Museums (AAM). Its response, however, has been very limited, although its Special Policy Committee has issued a mild statement of concernY On the credit
side it should be noted that the Association of Art Museum
Directors is in the process of preparing a proposed acquisition
policy.10
Because the AAM appears disinclined to establish an effective code of self-control measures, 1 the International Council
of Museums has been increasingly expected to be a prime mover
in establishing effective non-governmental controls.
Before turning to ICOM, it will be useful to establish a
theoretical framework of inquiry and to identify the nature
of the available framework of control, in order more clearly
Congress of Americanists and The Union of Prehistoric and Protohistoric Sciences, the latter of which adopted a resolution at its 1971
annual meeting that called for stricter international control of trade in
artistic and archaelogical material, N.Y. Times, Sept 18, 1971, at C5
col. 1.
The role of the American Association of Museums regarding transnational movement of international art treasures
has been and will continue to be one of cooperation and encouragement of effective, national procedures whereby the integrity of the object and its educational value are respected and
utilized together with full respect of the laws and regulations of
the country of origin.
As a non-governmental organization, the AMM is not in
a position to regulate its members or any national government
on these matters; it is in a position to stimulate and encourage
positive steps of professional and educational cooperation and
protection of the object and respect for the nation of origin
[emphasis added]. Letter from Kyran M. McGrath, AAM Director, to the author, May 26, 1972.
The AAM's Special Policy Committee urged the organization's
members "to abstain from purchasing and accepting donations of antiquities exported from their countries of origin in contravention to
the terms of the UNESCO draft convention." A major loophole is that
"this abstention is to apply only to antiquities from a country which has
adopted the farsighted policy of making duplicate material available
through legal channels, or has installed a procedure for granting export
licenses to material which has been approved by a board of review."
In an accompanying Report, the AAM Special Policy Committee surprisingly emphasizes, not the vulnerability of the "have" countries, but
of the U.S., which the Report suggests, is experiencing a "cultural drain."
Generally, the AAM gives the UNESCO Convention only "conditional
support" subject to the submission of "modifications." Report of the
AAM Special Policy Committee, 49 Museum News, May, 1971, at 22.
10 Letters from C. C. Cunningham, Director of the Art Institute of Chicago
to the author, May 30, 1972 and from Mitchell A. Wilder, Director of
the Amos Carter Museum of Western Art and President of the Associaton, to the author, July 3, 1972, and Aug. 8, 1972.
I' As, for example, recommended by P. Bator, Memorandum Submitted by
the Reporter to the Panel of the American Society of International Law
[on] the International Movement of National Art Treasures 67 (October
10, 1969, unpublished), summarized in HARvARn IAw REcoRD, Feb. 5,
1970, at 7, col. 1.
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to orient and appraise the ongoing activities of ICOM as a
non-governmental paradigm of transnational regulation.
THE

THEORETICAL

FRAMEWORK:

ORGANIZATIONAL

NESTING

The design of effective transnational regulation is enhanced
by a clear identification not only of the target problems and
available decision-making agencies, but also of the relevant
values. When these are clarified, a functional response may be
formulated that takes account of the strengths and weaknesses
of the available organizational machinery. The emerging institutional network may well include a variety of related governmental, intergovernmental and non-governmental mechanisms
whose relationships with each other are important.
Whether the emerging pattern of interorganizational relations is formally prescribed or operationally descriptive, and
however strong its internal linkages, 12 it will have an organizational ecology whose complexity demands both systematic and
systemic inquiry. Both empirically and normatively, the central
question is: how do (or would) the several regulatory structures interact most optimally? The complexity and dynamism
of the organizational system will correspond to the varying
styles of the component organizations.' 3 These styles may be
conveniently categorized as traditional, charismatic, classical
bureaucratic, human relations, system and network. 14 The preferred, dynamic style for a global system of interacting organizations is that of an autocoordinated, organic network that at
different points and times may be centralized or decentralized.
Without elevating form over function, it may be productive
to idealize the network as a "nesting" of organizations. Thus
seen, the typical problems of "linkage" and interaction among
the component organizations become less ones of conflict among
them than ones concerning the multi-dimensional "fit" at a
given point in time between different, organically related organizations oriented toward similar or identical goals. Presumably,
there will be a correlation between the closeness of fit among
the structures and the system's functional effectiveness. Component organizational structures may, and presumably should,
be flexible over time. Yet even if the nesting is seen to be
adjustable, this conceptualization will help in perceiving functional interstices, in attributing to the total institutional struc12Aldrich, Relations Between Organizations: A Critical Review of the
Literature, 24 INTERNATIONAL AsSOCIATIONs 26 (1972).

13 See Judge, The World Network of Organizations: A Symbol for the
1970's, 24 INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATIONS 18 (1972).

14 Id., at 20.
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ture some degree of predictability and stability, and in suggesting ways in which the component structures may shape
each other. For these reasons and as a technique of appraisal,
the "closeness of fit" between ICOM and other functionally
related structures of transnational control is indicative. Generally, with qualifications to be noted, each of the following
control structures may be seen as nesting within those of the
previous, more comprehensive structures.
THE AVAILABLE FRAMEWORK:

AN INVENTORY OF CONTROL STRUCTURES

1. Multilateral Agreements. Multilateral agreements to protect cultural property have their origins in several attempts
to isolate such property from the ravages of war and to prevent
the sort of devastating pillage premised on the traditional recognition that to the victor belongs the spoils. The first multilateral convention that offered peacetime international protection to cultural property was the European Convention on the
Protection of the Archaeological Heritage, signed in 1969 by
member states of the Council of Europe.1 5 Its emphasis is on
joint conservation, education and information programs, the
preparation of public and private inventories, regional cooperation and vigilance, the creation of archaeological zones for
excavation by qualified scientists alone, and limited rules
governing acquisitions by institutions under sovereign control.
No sanctions are provided by the convention.
The most comprehensive multilateral agreement on the
movement of cultural property is the UNESCO Convention on
the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import,
Export, and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, which
went into force in April, 197 2.11; As its travaux preparatoires
15 European Convention on the Protection of the Archaeological Heritage,
May 6, 1969, Europ. T.S. No. 66, 8 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 736 (1969). It
should be noted that there were earlier International Conventions, such
as the Hague Convention of 1907, several League of Nations treaties, and
the UNESCO-sponsored Convention on the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, that have offered some degree of
protection to cultural property in time of war.
16 Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, adopted
by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
General Conference at its 16th Session, Paris, Nov. 14, 1970, 10 INT'L
LEGAL MATERIALS 289 (1971). The Convention, which was adopted by a
vote of 77 to 1, with 8 abstentions, entered into force three months after
ratification by three signatories. As of August 1972, five countries Bulgaria, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Ecuador, and Nigeriahad ratified the Convention. On August 3, 1972, the U.S. Senate advised
and consented to ratification of the convention.
Two related draft conventions have been prepared by UNESCO.
A Draft Convention Concerning the Protection of Monuments, Groups
of Buildings and Sites of Universal Value was adopted by UNESCO at
its sixteenth session. SHC/MD/18, Paris, Feb. 21, 1972 (translated from
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make clear, it is not the first global agreement affecting the
international movement of cultural property. 1 7 It is, however,
the first global convention whose entire purpose is to protect
cultural property from non-military threats. Briefly, the convention, which is entirely prospective, binds its parties to
cooperate in establishing national registers of important cultural property, in facilitating the scientific and technical work
of collection agencies, in supervising archaeological field work,
in publicizing stolen or missing property, and in certifying
legally exportable items. Parties to the convention are obligated to bar the import, and upon request, take steps to recover
and return cultural property stolen from museums and the
like; and to bar the importation of uncertified items by domestic museums and institutions, "consistent with national
legislation." Bonafide purchasers of illegally imported items
with valid title to them are protected by a requirement that
the country of origin must pay compensation in order to regain
possession of them. The UNESCO Convention is of particular
interest to this study because of explicit references in it to
its relationship with other functionally related control structures,
including municipal laws (passim), bilateral agreements (Articles 9 and 15) ethical codes (Article 5) and non-governmental
programs (Articles 5 and 17) .18
the French). A Draft Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage and Draft Recommendation Concerning
the Protection at National Level, of the Cultural and Natural Heritage,
were prepared by a Special Committee of Government Experts at a
meeting on April 22, 1972, and were submitted to the UNESCO General
Conference for approval and adoption at its meeting in October, 1972.
17 C/18, Paris, June 15, 1972.
17 Agreements cited note 15 supra: also, several provisions in the Treaties
of Vienna of 1815 and 1966 and the post-Versailles treaties are of particular pertinence. See Means of prohibiting and perventing the illicit import, export and transfer of ownership of cultural property, Preliminary
Reoort prepared in compliance with Article 10.1 of the Rules of Procedure concerning Recommendations to Member States and International Conventions covered by the terms of Article IV, paragraph 4, of
the UNESCO Constitution, SHC/MD/3, Paris, August 8, 1969 (translated
from the French), at 2, 3, 9, 11 [hereinafter cited as Preliminary Report].
See generally B. HOLLANDER, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF ART 56 (1959),
passim.
18 The fundamental regulatory role of the UNESCO Convention was emphasized by Bonnie Burnham, Project Coordinator of ICOM, in a letter to
the author, July 17, 1972. She wrote:
It is my feeling that a working accord, beginning with the
ratification of the UNESCO Convention must be the basis for
future limiting of illicit import and export cf cultural property.
A central office dealing with this technical implementation of
the resolution of the UNESCO Convention would not necessarily
be a function of ICOM, but would be linked to it, perhaps as
an "international specialized body" and linked, as well, to
UNESCO, Interpcl, the Rome Centre for Conservation, and
other international bodies concerned. . . . In summary, a harmonisation and coordination of the activities of the participating 'nested' organizations, an encouragement of their potential
development.
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2. Bilateral Agreements. One weakness of the UNESCO Convention is its incapacity directly to control the importation by
private institutions and individual collectors of items purchased
in good faith which were not stolen, but rather were exported
contrary to the laws of the country of origin. 9 This is a particularly pronounced weakness in respect of importation through
"transit" countries such as Switzerland. The Convention does
not require one party to it to enforce the laws of another,
except in the instance of stolen property and, consistent with
national legislation, whenever a museum receives property that
has been certified by a country other than that of the museum
as belonging to its national patrimony. Another weakness of
the Convention resides in the generality, even vagueness, of
' 20 °
the term "cultural property.
These two vicissitudes of the UNESCO Convention can
be overcome on a specific, ad hoc basis by means of supplementary, bilateral agreements, which are explicitly encouraged
by Article 9 of the UNESCO Convention 2 1 and which find their
precedent in several nineteenth and early twentieth century
international agreements that governed archaeological expeditions conducted by foreign nationals. There is a close relationship between the UNESCO Convention and supplementary, bilateral agreements. Indeed, the cutting teeth in the draft
UNESCO Convention were pulled largely as a result of U.S.
diplomatic efforts to subsitute the concept of bilateral agreements for a blanket requirement in the draft Convention that
19 Article 7 (a) provides simply that "The States Parties to this Convention undertake: To take the necessary measures, consistent with national legislation, to prevent museums and similar institutions within
their territories from acquiring cultural property originating in another
State Party which has been illegally exported after entry into force
of this Convention, in the States concerned. Whenever possible, to
inform a State of origin Party to this Convention of an offer of such
cultural property illegally removed from that State after the entry into
force of this Ccnvention in both States" [emphasis added].
20 "For the purposes of this Convention, the term 'cultural property' means
property which, on religious or secular grounds, is specifically designated by each State as being of importance for archaeology, prehistory,
history, literature, art or science and which belongs to the following
categories: [eleven categories follow]." The travaux preparatoires of
the Convention indicate that the phraseology of this definition caused
continuing controversy.
21 "Any State Party to this Convention whose cultural patrimony is in
jeopardy from pillage of archaeological or ethnological materials may
call upon other States Parties who are affected. The States Parties to
this Convention undertake, in these circumstances, to participate in a
concerted international effort to determine and to carry out the necessary concrete measures, including the control of exports and imports
and international commerce in the specific materials concerned. Pending agreement each State concerned shall take provisional measures
to the extent feasible to prevent irremediable injury to the cultural
heritage of the requesting State."

REGULATION OF MUSEUMS

would have obligated its parties to enforce the export laws of
other parties.22 Thus, a U.S.-Mexican treaty, 23 in force since
March, 1971, not only pledges both parties to bar illegal imports, but also obligates them to take judicial action under
municipal stolen property laws to effect the recovery and return
of pre-Columbian objects, Spanish colonial artifacts and religious art, and pre-1920 documents taken from official archives.
Although the treaty is intended primarily to protect the Mexican patrimony, it quid pro quo establishes that serious professional field work by U.S. archaeologists in Mexico will be
welcome. The bi-national feeling of trust that the treaty engenders serves not only to encourage a mutually beneficial
exchange of cultural items, but to assure that the scientific
community will have continuing access to the field.2 4 Moreover,
the U.S.-Mexico agreement will serve as the nucleus of a
contemplated western hemispheric convention sponsored by
the OAS, and eventually perhaps, of an expanded global regime.
3. Non-governmental Controls. In order of comprehensiveness
and long-term nesting within the overall control structure the
three NGO regulatory structures are: international NGO's;
domestic NGO's; and private characteristically bilateral, arrangements between museums. The order of presenting these
three regulatory structures has been reversed in this study in
order to accommodate a clear presentation of the role of ICOM
in response to the deficiencies of other control structures. The
order of presentation adopted by this article should not, however, blur the perception of ICOM as at least potentially the
most comprehensive NGO structure.
a. Private Agreements. It is widely accepted that spiraling
market for artifacts and objets d'art can be markedly wound
down by encouraging short- and long-term loans and exchanges,
and by the sharing of cultural information among collecting
See, e.g., the comments of the State Department's chief representative
to the UNESCO Conference, quoted in the Washington Post, April 4,
1970, at B7, col. 8.
23Treaty of Co-operation with the United Mexican States Providing for
the Recovery and Return of Stolen Archaeological, Historical and Cultural Properties, July 17, 1970, [1970].
24 The risk that illegal activity may lead threatened countries to bar foreign archaeological expeditions provides a strcng incentive for collector
interests to favor transnational controls. The recent refusal of a U.S.
museum either to explore the pedigree of a valuable collection of
ancient go!d, or to cooperate in its return to the probable country of
origin, Turkey. has led to retaliation by that country against all archaeological expeditions, even the most impeccably legitimate of them. Washington Post, March 10, 1970, at A12, col. 7. Archaeologists are, of course,
cften restricted in their field work on the basis of other national
policies, such as that of military security.
22
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interests and institutions. Although the UNESCO Convention
and the U.S.-Mexican Treaty explicitly second such programs,
they are handicapped by the sheer complexity and expense of
being effective. Of considerable efficacy in supplementing intergovernmental agreements are private agreements, such as that
signed in 1968 between the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New
York and the National Institute of Anthropology and History in
Mexico City. This agreement has, for example, stimulated a flow
of previously stockpiled pre-Columbian objects northward, and
ancient Mediterranean objects southward..2 5 To be sure, the
development of such private agreements is demonstrably incremental, and may be handicapped by a lack of cooperation
within a country between a disinterested, "have" institution
and an import-seeking, "have-not" institution. Nevertheless,
private agreements may serve a useful role in easing the market and in creating mutual trust both among leading collectors
of importing countries, and between them and officials and
institutions within the exporting countries.
b. Domestic Non-governmental Regulation. Private intermuseum agreements are commonly regarded as a luxury of affluent musums. Those less well-endowed institutions with less to
offer foreign lenders may feel left out. One alternative to bilateral private agreements are multilatral ones within a single country that enable small museums with limited resources of time
and money to receive the benefits of bilateral agreements. In return, all museums, large and small, that are parties to the
agreement may be required to adopt restrictive acquisition
policies and other self-controls.
In the context of the current crisis, the case for organized,
joint self-control of what has been described as the "voracious"
acquisition policies of U.S. museums has been well stated:
In order to avoid governmental regulations, museums must
act to police themselves. Museums must adopt policies which will
provide complete, honest, and potentially public pedigrees for all
[M]useums would clearly find it easier to
their acquisitions ....
resist the temptation of buying beautiful objects which they know
to have been stolen, if they were to adopt a code of ethics which
20
would regulate their relationships with art dealers.

So far, neither effel.tive voluntary agreements nor an effec25 Zelle, supra note 1, at 25. The importance of a comprehensive, global
regime of control, of self-regulation by private interests was noted in
the official statement of the U.S. Department of State presented to the
Senate in its hearing on the UNESCO Convention. Hearings on S. Exec.
Rep. No. 29, 92d Cong., 2d SeSs. 11 (1972).
26 Coggins, The Maya Scandal, supra note 1, at 16.
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tive ethical code among them, have been forthcoming.2 7 Several
inhibitions may be responsible. Among them are mutual suspicion among domestic museums; the bugbear or perhaps
excuse that an agreement among museums would violate antitrust laws; 28 the notion that restrictions on museums may serve
only to deflect the market to individual collections; the "Elgin
syndrome" - that is, the attitude that the object would have
been lost had it not been for a collector's or art dealer's purchase and protection of it (thereby sanitizing the intermediary
dealer); the reluctance to alienate any source of gifts; and the
uniquely U.S. attitude that all museums should be encyclopedic, eclectic, and therefore vast in scope. Inhibitions such
as these continue to hamstring the domestic organizations whose
leadership is necessary for an effective domestic NGO response
to the underlying problems.
The most significant offsetting perception to these inhibitions, which have served to block the development of joint
measures, is that a laissez-faire philosophy of acquisition may
lead the art and archaeological "have" countries to bar all
serious field activity conducted by museum interests, even
cooperative ones, from the "have-not" countries, especially
29
the United States.
The strongest joint action taken by U.S. collecting interests
so far was a resolution adopted in 1971 by the Society of American Archaeology. 30 In lieu of organized, domestic NGO controls,
27 In a letter, dated September 19, 1969 to L. Arthur Minnich, Executive
Secretary of the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO, Kyran M.
McGrath, Director of the American Association of Museums, wrote that
although the AAM was prepared "to assist in any means possible to
develop a meaningful program to prevent the profitable traffic in
objects, especially pre-Columbian, either stolen or smuggled," nevertheless it opposed the "overkill" posed by the suggested imposition of disciplinary sanctions by governments on instituticns which acquired
illegally imported cultural property. There is no mention of selfregulation as an alternative to the imposition of government sanctions.
28 E.g., The American Institute of Architects was recently charged by the
U.S. government for alleged violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act.
The action charged that AIA's practice, under its ethical code, of banning competitive bidding among its members was a restraint against
interstate trade. The suit asserted that as a result of the practice, price
competition in the sale of architectural services has been eliminated
and customers have been deprived of the benefits of free competition.
The action would, of course, be legally distinguishable from a "trade"
agreement to protect archaeological treasures insofar as the activity controlled in the latter instance would be contrary to both public policy
and, in various instances, international agreement. N.Y. Times, May
18, 1972, at 15, col. 1; Wall Street Journal, May 18, 1972, at 5, col. 1;
Washington Post, May 18, 1972, at A3, col. 5.
29 Supra note 24, and N.Y. Times, Sept. 18, 1971, at 5, col. 1.
no Resolution of the Society of American Archeology, Zelle, ed., Newsletter of the United States National Committee/International Council
of Museums [hereinafter cited as U.S.-ICOM Newsletter], Aug. 1971, at 2,
col. 1.
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several museums have unilaterally adopted strict acquisition
policies that proscribe the acceptance by them of items of
suspect provenance.3 1 Explicit encouragment of such unilateral
action may lead in time to a domestic climate more tolerant of
proposals for jointly organized codes and controls.
c. InternationalNon-government Regulation. In view of the
failure of a domestic NGO regime to emerge in the world's
greatest art-consuming country as a means of self-controlling
what is unquestionably a transnational problem, recourse to
the authority of international NGO's, such as ICOM, seems
essential.3 2 In moving from domestic to international NGO's,
not only do the pressure groups expand geographically and
quantitatively, but public-private linkages come into play,
which, aside from those between the U.S. government and the
Smithsonian Institution and the National Gallery of Art respectively, are generally alien to the laissez-faire tradition of
museum acquisition in the United States. An advantage of international regulation by NGO's is that as NGO's assume regulatory authority the effective sources of pressure are no longer
limited to competing private institutions; rather, national museums with governmental support may come to exert pressure through diplomatic channels, with considerable foreign
policy implications.
See the acquisition policies of the University of Pennsylvania Museum,
adopted April 1, 1970, ICOM, Ethics of Acquisition 7 (undated); the
Metropolitan Museum of Art, announced May 3, 1971, U.S.-ICOM Newsletter, supra note 30; Harvard University, adopted June 21, 1971,
ICOM, Ethics of Acquisition 8 (undated). The University of Pennsylvania Museum rejects all items that are unaccompanied by a "pedigree,"
including legal export papers and a description of provenance. The
Metropolitan Museum's system of control involves the dispatch of a
description (accompanied by a photo) of all offered items to all countries
in which the item could have its origin. Foreign officials are given 45
days to inform the museum that the work is or is not important enough
to its patrimony to proscribe its export. Harvard's policy puts the burden on each museum officer responsible for acquisitions in his department to do his utmost to ensure that artifacts and works of art which
are being acquired by Harvard either by outright purchase or by gift
have left the country of origin with approval of its government and
have entered the United States properly, so that Harvard can claim a
valid title to the object. Otherwise, rejections of the items and steps
to return it to the country of origin are required. This embargo on
illicit materials also includes, "if appropriate," materials received on
loan for exhibition. Williams, supra note 1. It should be noted finally,
that other domestic museums have co-operated in returning legally
exported items to their countries of origin. Coggins, Maya Scandal,
supra note 1.
32 The U.S. government has officially supported the work of ICOM. See
Report of the U.S. Delegation to the Special Committee of Governmental Experts to Examine the Draft Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of
Ownership of Cultural Property 41 (1970), submitted to the Secretary
of State, July 27, 1970 (reproduced in the 1970 DEPT. OF STATE, BULL.
22). UNESCO has also supported the development of acquisition codes
as a useful element of transnational control.
31

1972

REGULATION OF MUSEUMS

The role generally of international NGO's in the transnational legal process has been described as one of limited
legal authority. NGO's are regarded, indeed usually designed
to serve as pressure groups, shapers of public opinion, advocators of preferred policies, and as channels of transnational
communication and exchange. In sum, "they can be effective in
providing information and applying pressure in the pursuit of
their goals. If nothing else, non-governmental organizations provide a mechanism through which private interests in various
states can cooperate to bring pressure on their respective governments and on the relevant international institutions. ' 3 3 Moreover, NGO's may help relieve overloaded international governmental organizations of demands on them. From even a
conventional, modest viewpoint, then, the role of NGO's may
at least be called "para-legal."
It is rudimentary, therefore, that ICOM as an NGO offers
technical assistance to both intergovernmental organizations
and to domestic authorities, as, for example, through its special
relationship with Interpol to facilitate the return of clandestinely exported property. 34 But more important than this limited
role is the possibility that the policies and norms of ICOM,
combined with supporting programs, can be marshalled into a
body of effective legal constraints and facilities. The establishment of authoritative standards by NGO's, particularly scientifictechnical ones, is an example of the legally operational role of
such organizations. Similarly, ICOM's role may be transformed
from a para-legal into a quasi-legal or legal one.
There are, to be sure, several other international NGO's
operating within this sphere; as recognized by UNESCO these
include the International Association of Art, the International
Council of Monuments and Sites, the International Council for
(1966). For an
excellent discussion cf the decline of governments in the West and the

33 W. COPLIN, THE FUNCTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 105

concomitant rise of transnational relationships based on non-governmental organizations, see Hughes, Whose Century? 50 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 476

(1972). Note too, this comment: "that traditional legal theory denies
these entities [NGO's] a specific and formal law creating or law applying role, cannot detract from the bustling reality." W. HOLDER & G.
BRENNAN, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 293 (1972). See also, S.
BASTID, 2 DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC: LE DROIT DES ORGANISATIONS
INTERNATIONALES 317 (1970); J. LADOR-LEDERER, INTERNATIONAL NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS 82-84 (1963); Skjelsbaek, The Growth
of International Nongovernmental Organization in the Twentieth Century, 25 INT'L ORG. 420 (1971); Szalai, The Future of International
Organizations, 5 INT'L ASSN'S 267 (1972); L. White, INTERNATIONAL
NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS 10 (1951).
34Article 17(3) of the UNESCO Convention specifically provides that

UNESCO may call on the cooperation of competent NGO's in this
respect.
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Philosophy and Humanistic Studies, the International Committee
on the History of Art, and the International Centre for the
Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property.3 3 Of all the relevant international NGO's, however, ICOM
seems to exhibit the greatest potential as an effective transnational mechanism of control.
THE INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL OF MUSEUMS

ICOM, established in 1946 with its headquarters in Paris,
is composed of about 3,000 institutions and dues-paying representatives of recognized institutions in 100 countries, and of
national committees in seventy-four.3 6 Financed by members'
dues, foundation grants, and UNESCO support, it is a consulta3s
37
and ECOSOC.
tive organization of both UNESCO
The component bodies of ICOM include a General Assembly,
which consists of all members of ICOM and which meets every
three years as ICOM's "Sovereign Body"; a 26-member Executive Council that is elected by the General Assembly to prepare
and implement programs and budgets; a Board that acts between sessions of the Executive Council; a Secretariat in Paris;
the National Committees; several "International Specialized
Bodies"; an Advisory Committee that meets every year and is
composed of the chairmen of the national committees and the
international specialized bodies (the chairman of the Advisory
Committee is an ex officio member of the Executive Council);
39
and, finally, the UNESCO-ICOM Documentation Center.
The expressed aims of ICOM are to stress the essential
35 The first three of these organizations, together with ICOM, participated
as observers in the UNESCO meetings. Report of the Special Committee of Governmental Experts to Examine the Draft Convention on
the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and
Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property [hereinafter Report of the
Special Committee], 9 INT'L. LEGAL MAT. 1038 (1970). The latter two,
together with ICOM and the International Council of Monuments and
Sites, were acknowledged as competent sources of technical assistance
by UNESCO in the preliminary report on the Convention. Preliminary
Report, supra note 17, at 13. A sixth NGO, the International Federation of Library Associations, had been recognized by UNESCO and had
participated as an observer in the UNESCO meetings, but was recently
suspended by UNESCO. 24 INT'L ASSN'S 216 (1972).
36 Interview with Hugues de Varine-Bohan, Director ICOM, in Washington, D.C., June 14, 1972. Other data in this summary, unless otherwise
indicated to the contrary, are taken from 1970-71 Y.B. IN'L ORG'S (13th
ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as Yearbook].
37 The Union of International Associations lists ICOM as an "A" category
consultative organization of "proven competence in an important field of
UNESCO's work." Yearbook, supra note 36, at 1020.
38 ICOM is listed as a third-category consultative organization to ECOSOC,
that is, one that "can make occasional and u_ eful contributions to the
work of the Council." Id.
39 The International Council of Museums, I.C.O.M. STATUTES § V, Art. 13
(1969).
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unity of purpose behind the museum concept; to further cooperation between museums and members of the museum community in different countries; to protect and promote museums'
interests and to widen their influence, and to emphasize the
importance of their role in community life and in the promotion
of knowledge and understanding among peoples. 40 ICOM's current statement of aims diverges from an earlier statement which
emphasized cooperation with "international, educational, scientific, and cultural organizations" toward not simply the "promond understanding among peoples", as
tion" of "knowledge
expressed in the current statement, but also the "preservation,
advancement, and diffusion of museums. ' 41 If such statements
are to be taken as serious articulations of shared norms, the
policy framework today for ICOM action in regulating the flow
of cultural property would seem to have been restricted. Nevertheless, ICOM has more ambitiously and significantly articulated
its current place in the transnational system of control as follows:
It should be noted in the first place that the praiseworthy
efforts of UNESCO towards the establishment of international
legal regulations serve only to reduce the problems involved in
the field of international exchanges. The law has never restrained
any but those who choose to respect it or whom it can reach. It
is therefore to be feared that each of the governments participat-

ing in this project might seek only to project its own interests
and that the terms of the law could not put a stop to illegal
manipulations, fraud and smuggling. The criticism is not meant

in any way whatever to underestimate the extent of UNESCO's
efforts but to stress the fact that unless the museums meet their
own responsibilities such efforts cannot be fully effective.
In spite of all the cleverness of which fraudulent dealers
might be capable, the problem remains simple. The fraudulent

dealer is only a go-between who is himself either ignorant of the
law, knows how to avoid it or profits from its absence, and he
might therefore also elude the proposed regulations. However,

the boycott solution remains. .

.

. It is vital for museums to

cooperate and to coordinate their efforts. Their mission can only
be fully accomplished within a framework of cooperation be-

tween the museums of the entire world-

a cooperation which

will be capable of surmounting personal, local and national
42
interests.

A decade of ICOM concern about the rampant traffic in art
and archaeological treasures led to an April, 1970 meeting of
ten experts to design a set of ethical rules for guiding museum
acquisitions. 43 Their meeting took place just prior to the meetId., § III, Art. 5.
41 1961-62 Y.B. INT'L ORG'S 1341 (9th ed. 1963).
42 ICOM News, Sept. 1969, at 49.
43 A short summary of their deliberations may be found in ICOM, Ethics
40

of Acquisition, supra note 31, at 5.
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ing of the Special Committee of Governmental Experts to examine the draft UNESCO Convention, to which meeting ICOM
sent observers. After ICOM had drafted a set of twenty rules,
it emphasized at the UNESCO meeting two points: that an
effective regime of control must govern traffic through the
so-called transit countries and entrep6ts, and that "the legal
measures to be taken [by UNESCO] could be effective only
if they were backed up by a moral code for museum workers."
ICOM reported on its newly drafted ethical rules, and commented upon the importance of the transnational market in cultural property and the utility of export certificates. 44 At its own
1970 meeting, the ICOM experts recommended, and its General
Assembly later adopted, a resolution that museums develop
explicit, scientific programs of acquisition; that they acquire
and exchange items purposefully, selectively, and cooperatively;
that they never acquire items without full documentation; and
that they not acquire objects solely for their commercial value.
The resolution also urged cooperation among museums in field
work and expeditions, and the sharing of documentation between an expedition and the country in which the expedition
was conducted. Finally, ICOM adopted a statement that "[a] s
a matter of principle, a museum or other collecting institution
or individual should act in good faith to make all reasonable
efforts to avoid acquiring, directly or indirectly, any object
which it has reason to believe, either from inadequate documentation or other available evidence, has been illegally removed from its country of origin. '45 The ICOM resolution was
officially characterized as "a first step in establishing a professional ethical code regarding acquisition"; it was to comprise
a set of "ethical rules", to which member museums might voluntarily adhere "in working out their own policies. ' 46 Although
in general, ICOM rules are given authority as a "practical
application of the . . . Statutes",47 it is doubtful that the new
ethical rules are considered to be "rules" in this technical
sense.
The ICOM Secretariat prepared a form for completion by
all museums wishing to formalize their adherance to the rules.48
44 See Report of the Special Committee, supra note 35, at 1039.
45 U.S.-ICOM Newsletter, supra note 30, May 1970 at 1.
46 Ethics of Acquisition, supra note 31, at 5.
47 I.C.O.M. STATUTES, § XVI, Art. 46 ("Rules").
48As a first step in establishing a professional ethical code

regarding
acquisition, the staff of the .......... .......
................ museum accepts the
ICOM recommendations as a minimum standard for the collection of
objects, thereby agreeing to assist other countries in safeguarding and
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It also undertook the preparation of a summary of domestic
antiquity laws, scheduled for completion in 1973, to which will
be appended the addresses of local Interpol agencies and a
"first list" of museums voluntarily adhering to the rules. 49
Programmatic support for the resolution is being or will
soon be provided by several ICOM services. 50 These are in
increasingly close association with Interpol in the dissemination
of information taken from a "stolen objects" list and in the
developing of a system to verify the legality of exports; a
periodic bulletin; the UNESCO-ICOM Museum Documentation
Center,5 1 which inter alia microfilms domestic antiquity laws for
ready reference and analysis; an "inter-exchange" service to
inform museums of the availability on loan of surplus items and
to facilitate the exchange of these; 2 the organization of regional
meetings to discuss mutual legal and law enforcement problems;
and the dissemination, principally through ICOM News, of information about progressive or model museum acquisition policies.
It is clear that the ICOM "ethical rules", even as institutionally supported, represent only a beginning. Beyond the establishment of a more binding ethical code- the logical next
step- what can be done? To answer this question, a clear
identification of the values at stake will be productive. One
study of the problem lists eleven such values: greater accessibility to art, and visibility of it; the preservation of the national
enriching their cultural heritage, and to give preferential treatment in
all professional activities to other museums adhering to the code.
Date
Signature of responsible officer
Signing of the agreement is valid upon receipt of this form along with
a description of the museum's programme and acquisition policy, and a
description of acquisitions and services requested by the museum to
ICOM Secretariat, UNESCO House. 1 rue Miollis, Paris 15e.
49 Ethics of Acquisition, supra note 31, at 5.
50 See generally, Zelle, ICOM Ethics of Acquisition: A Report to the Profession, 50 Museum News, April, 1972, at 31.
51 The UNESCO-ICOM Documentation Center is the outgrowth of a library
established in 1947, by the Museum and Monument Division of UNESCO
for its own research and documentation. In 1948, it became a part of
ICOM. It is administered by a small staff and is now the largest library
of its kind. Its activities are governed by Article 39 of the I.C.O.M.
STATUTES.

[i]ts functions shall be (a) to conserve and classify printed and
manuscript documents and illustrations of museological interest
received from UNESCO, ICOM or other sources, and to make
such documents available to members of UNESCO and ICOM
and, whenever practicable, to all other qualified experts; (b)
to assist the Secretariat of ICOM with any part of its work of a
documentary or bibliographical nature.
02 See U.S.-ICOM Newsletter, supra note 30, May 1970, at 3, col. 2, for a

description of an exemplary exchange of cultural property.
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patrimony; the exporting country's interest in export; the use
of art as a good ambassador; the importing country's interest
in imports; the enrichment of the national patrimony; the general interest in the breakdown of parochialism; the preservation
of differences and the division of labor; the preservation of individual works of art; the preservation of archaeological evidence;
the preservation of sets and collections; the preservation of
values derived from particular locations; and values served by
cooperation in enforcing the existing law. 53
Of these values, all of which are germane to ICOM's activities, the last four would seem to be particularly so in establishing a global, specifically non-governmental structure of selfcontrol based upon the enlightened self-interests of museums
and the nesting within more comprehensive structures of control. Indeed, these four values, with their emphasis on the context of an item, were specifically identified and merged by
the ICOM Board to form the two salient principles guiding the
design of its ethical rules:
From the scientific point of view, a museum object has
no real cultural value unless its origin, history and context are
known and dccumented with maximum accuracy.
From the moral point of view, an object of doubtful origin
would be dangerous for the good reputation of the acquiring
museum and would consequently present difficulties for future
cooperation between that museum and other similar institu54
tions.

It is true, as one useful study of relevant attitudes and
controls noted, that individual museums have adopted a laissezfaire viewpoint largely because of a self-fulfilling fear of competitive disadvantage. 55 But museums are questioning more and
more whether the "market" is free. The evidence suggests that
it is not; foreign governments may, and do, retaliate against
illegal exports of their national patrimony by simply shutting
off the market to all excavators, collectors, and dealers. Moreover, museums have come to realize that their interests do not
necessarily coincide with those of the individual collector or
antiquarian.
As the science of museology has developed, scholarship has
come to challenge connoisseurship. Museums, and increasingly
their client communities, appreciate that wholeness and historic
context are preferable to quantity and isolated fragments.
Bator, supra note 11, at 7-21. Cf. UNESCO Convention, supra note 16,
(preamble).
54 ICOM News, September 1969, at 49.
55 Zelle, supra note 1, at 20.
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Broadly speaking, this shifting emphasis reflects a substitution
of enlightenment for wealth.
The museum community's increasingly mature emphasis on
contextual, cross-cultural, and holistic education cannot tolerate
the pillage, "thinning", dismemberment, and separation from
geographical and historical context performed by the obliging
huaquero, or grave-robber. Thus, the owl of Minerva begins
to fly only at the sunset of expectations, when the most precious
educational values of cultural objects are forever lost and when
national retaliation, such as that taken by Turkey, restricts or
even cuts off the source of supply. Having perceived the need
for self-controls and having appreciated the coincidence of
their emerging values with those articulated by ICOM, 6 museums may find it constructive to support ICOM controls, which
nest within the larger framework of a more comprehensive,
principally intergovernmental regime of control. One scenario
follows of how the ICOM regulatory mechanism might develop.
ICOM's ethical rules have become identified with the more
education-oriented, less parochial values which are becoming
more widely accepted by museums. As these rules are adopted
57
by the museums, they will serve to mobilize shame not only
through diplomatic channels by nation-states that have been
pressured by domestic museums, but also by museums which
have high standards of acquisition against those with lower
standards. Publicity is a strong disinfectant.
A second step for ICOM in transforming its transnational
role from a para-legal to a legal one, would be to establish
its ethical rules as a code of binding rules, perhaps by incorporating them by reference into the ICOM Statutes. A third
step would be to support the rules with sanctions. According
to the ICOM Statutes, "among the methods" by which it may
carry out its "aims" are:
(a) to establish itself in the largest possible number of countries and to recruit the greatest number of qualified
members,
(b) to set up study groups and working parties, either permanent or temporary,
(c)

to organise and encourage,

i)
ii)
56

57

large international conferences of museum experts,
smaller international meetings of specialists on muse-

eums and kindred subjects,
ICOM has urged museums not only to reject items of doubtful ownership, but to define and publicize "the criteria which give value to an
object." ICOM News, Sept. 1969, at 49.

On the mobilization of shame as an inducement to compliance with the
decisions of international organizations, see generally S. SCHWEBEL, ed.
THE

EFFECTIVENESS

OF INTERNATIONAL

482, 496, 511-12, 516 (1971).
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434-35, 442, 447-56,
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to encourage the international exchange of experts and
students, missions of experts, traveling scholarships in
museology, and international seminars on the improvement
of museum techniques,
to study the problems involved in the international exchange of museum objects,
to organize international exhibitions, to keep a watching
brief on the quality, technical methods and the coordination of international exhibitions in which museums take
part,
to carry out international surveys,
to encourage the exchange of information and publications,
to issue periodical or occasional publications,
to collect documents dealing with museum subjects, and
to make them accessible,
to promote, in addition to missions of museum experts,
the free flow of documents, objects and technical material
relating to museums.5 8

It will be noticed that none of these
the legitimacy of a sanction. To be sure,
utes provides one authoritative sanction:
bership (and presumably its benefits)

"methods" approaches

article 12 of the Statexpulsion from memof "any persons for
not paying their subscriptions or for any other legitimate reason" [emphasis added]. The latter basis for expulsion, though
cryptic, might offer a legitimate basis for the imposition of
sanctions to support ICOM ethical rules, were it not for its
limitation to "persons". Because of this limitation, institutions,
the prime target, seemingly would escape the available sanction
of expulsion from membership. Perhaps the most feasible, strong
sanction would be a voluntary refusal by museums to cooperate
in loans, exchanges and research sharing, with museums that
do not follow minimal ethics of acquisition.
The eleven methods quoted above at least provide some
basis for the exercise of administrative discretion as a minimal
sanction, and also provide a framework for the explicit formulation of sanctions, by means of their explicit incorporation
5 '
Perhaps more akin to a genuine sanction
into the Statutes.is the mandate "to promote, in addition to missions of museum
experts, the free flow of documents, objects and technical material relating to museums." 0 This mandate might serve to facilitate the exercise of administrative discretion in a manner
tantamount to the imposition of sanctions. In any event, the
serve at the very least to generate positive
and informed incentives for transnational cooperation and to
eleven methods

I.C.O.M. STATUTES, § III, Art. 6.
59 Id., § XVII, Art. 47, provides the procedures for the amendment of the
Statutes.
60 Id., § III, Art. 6, (k).
58
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mobilize shame in response to violations of the rules. The only
apparent inhibition to a broader regime of control based on the
methods may be found in the first one listed, though it is not
necessarily the primus inter pares ("to establish itself in the
largest possible number of countries and to recruit the greatest
number of qualified members"). The foregoing considerations
are presented not only to identify available legal or quasi-legal
tools, but also to assist in the drafting, already begun, of a new
set of ICOM Statutes.61
Although the establishment of sanctions under either the
current or revised Statutes may be premature and ICOM's
effectiveness and efficiency might be endangered by a hasty
formulation or attempted exercise of them, 62 nevertheless, their
seed may be found in the ICOM Statutes, and in Rule 20 of
the ICOM ethical rules:
The museums of any country which bind themselves to follow the ethical rules and the practical proposals formulated in
paragraphs 1 to 19 of this document, will agree to offer each
other prefereritial treatment in 3 all professional activities, compatible with the existing laws.G

A set of sanctions might become operational on one of four
bases: the "methods" listed in the ICOM Statutes; an application of Rule 20 of the ethical rules either voluntarily by the
museums or by ICOM enforcement; an amendment of the current ICOM Statutes; or provision for them in the revised
Statutes.
We may discern, then, a multi-stage process by which law,
acting dynamically as both a constraint and a facilitation, may
articulate authoritative procedures and powers, and, combined
with various established methods and programs, provide a
blueprint for helping govern and further the mutual interests
within an entire arena of social action and interaction.
New programmatic inducements to cooperation might well
expedite the development of a code of ethics and, later, a
quasi-legal or legal regime of control. New ICOM programs
might include the establishment of an international committee
to review and harmonize domestic definitions and regulations
related to the term "cultural property"; the establishment of
61 Interview with Hugues de Varine-Bohan, Director ICOM, in Washington, D.C., June 14, 1972.

62 For an expression of ICOM's disinclination to do either at this time
("If we did, we wouldn't have any members left"), see Hamblin, supra
note 1, at 23.

63 Ethics of Acquisition, supra note 31, at 3.
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a conciliation and mediation panel; the formulation of a legal
committee to draft uniform laws for the registration of sites
and for excavation; the education of museum personnel, particularly in the preparation of object inventories; an expanded
program of technical assistance to UNESCO, pursuant to Article
17 (3) of the UNESCO Convention; the encouragement of intermuseum loans and exchanges of indefinite duration; the identification of various art forms as "endangered species", figuratively within the meaning of that term in U.S. conservation
legislation; the adoption of corresponding transnational controls;
the promotion of visual substitutes, such as rubbings, copies,
and projected materials; and the "establishment of international
committees of experts qualified to give useful advice to States
having difficulty in identifying, collecting and preserving their
''64
cultural property.
The endowment of ICOM's conservation programs with external financing would be of enormous assistance. Such assistance might be put toward the photographing and cataloguing
of art treasures, and the establishment of a readily accessible
means of information retrieval for use by dealers, collectors,
and police authorities alike.65
Conservation programs, if properly funded, may spin off
from feasibility studies, such as the Mayan Reserve Project
launched jointly by the Center for Inter-American Relations
and the American Society of International Law, which has undertaken to examine the efficacy within a particular area of
alternative measures for protection, such as increased guards,
international intelligence work, electronic devices, museums,
and fencing. 6 Finally, and perhaps most important, financial
assistance to ICOM might enable it to provide incentives for
museums to develop unilaterally imposed self-controls. Such
incentives might include the tying of loans, exchanges and other
positive programs to the demonstrated cooperation, enlightened
acquisitions policies, and acceptable conduct of the beneficiary
institutions. Perhaps it is not too hopeful to expect that such
measures would move ICOM well along toward the status
of a non-governmental organization, such as the International
Committee of the Red Cross, with more than para-legal or
rudimentary legal authority.
64UNESCO suggested this role for ICOM. Preliminary Report, supra
note 17, at 13.
65 The two UNESCO Draft Conventions, supra note 16, provide respectively for an International Fund (Articles 11-13) and a World Heritage
66 Fund (Articles 15-17).
Coggins, The Maya Scandal, supra note 1, at 15.
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CONCLUSION

"Elginism" - the dismemberment of an historical monument, piece by piece, for permanent export - together with
all other uncontrolled handling of national art treasures is
nothing new. But fed by a mounting interest in objets d'art
as speculative investment and by a skyrocketing market in
them,6 the problem has become worse. Keeping in mind the implicated values, it is difficult to dispute the ironic fact "that
the warring interests of nations, museums, collectors and dealers, and their failure to achieve agreement on ethics and civilized tactics, have combined to drive price and demand steadily
upward and to make thieving too enticing to resist." 68
In response, a multidimensional regime of transnational
controls has begun to emerge which, if the component organizations strive to fit themselves together into a single, functional
system with shared goals, may at least gradually come to fulfill
the prescription that "[e]verything must be organized the way
it is for drugs, with everyone cooperating - police, professionals,
museums, governments - to communicate the names of known
culprits, to keep up-to-date international files." 9 It is encouraging that this statement, which explicitly recognizes a multiple
governmental and non-governmental response to the problem,
was made by ICOM, a non-governmental organization that shows
an unfulfilled promise of helping shape the entire regime of
control. ICOM controls cannot, of course, directly stem the
flow of objects of doubtful provenance into the hands of individual collectors, but at least indirectly they can help dry up
a market that presently is bathed in inflationary speculation.
In working within an emerging framework of intergovernmental
structure, ICOM can maintain a closeness of fit with related
institutions that permits it to help shape them, as well as to
conform to them with a clear awareness of their mutual nesting. Thus, ICOM may well emerge as a creative, as well as
responsive, non-governmental organization with more than minimal legal authority in the process of transnational regulation.
67 It is estimated that the average market value of archaeological artifacts
has tripled during the last decade. Gaskill, supra note 1, at 26, col. 1.
8 Hamblin, supra note 1, at 24.
69 Statement of Hugues de Varine-Bohan, Director of ICOM, quoted in
Hamblin, id. at 26. Cf. a statement accompanying the University of
Pennsylvania Museum's acquisitions policy that "[p]robably the only
6

effective way to stop this wholesale destruction of archaeological sites
is to regulate the trade in cultural objects . . . just as most countries

in the world today regulate domestic trade in foodstuffs, drugs, securities,
and other commodities." Ethics of Acquisition, supra note 31, at 7.
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